Private Information in Repeated Auctions by Johannes Horner & Julian Jamison
Private Information in Repeated Auctions∗





We study an inﬁnitely repeated two-player game with incomplete information, where the stage game is a
ﬁrst-price auction with pure common values. Before playing, the bidders receive aﬃliated private signals about
the value, which itself does not change over time. Items sold in such an auction environment include bonds,
wine, neighboring oil tracts, and wholesale ﬁsh. In this setting, learning occurs only through observation of
the bids. We show that in the case of one-sided incomplete information, this information is eventually revealed
and the seller extracts essentially the entire rent (for large enough discount factors). In contrast, the unique
equilibrium with patient players under two-sided incomplete information is purely pooling: no information is
ever revealed. In the special case with only two types of each bidder, we are able to fully characterize the
equilibrium for all values of the discount factor and all priors.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper analyzes an inﬁnitely-repeated, ﬁrst-price auction between two players with private information about
the common value of all the units. It generalizes Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1983), which solves the
ﬁnite-horizon, binary type, one-sided incomplete information case.
We are primarily interested in the optimal strategy of the bidders: how can a bidder exploit his private
information without giving it away? How valuable is private information to a bidder? A related concern is the
informational content of the prices: are prices revealing and aggregating the players’ information? In this sense,
our motivation is close to Kyle (1985), who analyses continuous auctions and insider trading, although there is
no noise trading in our model.1
I n f o r m a t i o nr e v e l a t i o ni nr e p e a t e dﬁrst-price auctions has already been studied by Hon-Snir, Monderer and
Sela (1998), in a model with independent private values. They show that information is eventually fully revealed.
However, because “equilibrium analysis of repeated ﬁrst-price auctions in the framework of repeated games with
incomplete information is complex”, they assume that players are not rational but use learning schemes.
In contrast with these ﬁndings, our results imply that when players are patient and rational, prices do not
reveal any information at all. That is, the unique equilibrium (subject to a reﬁnement that actually helps the
seller) exhibits the ratchet eﬀect identiﬁed in games with one-sided incomplete information by Freixas-Guesnerie-
Tirole (1985) and Hart-Tirole (1988). Here, both bidders make low bids consistent with their worst private
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1Another diﬀerence is that in his model, bidders choose quantities and the price clears the markets. Because in his model bidders
foresee how their action aﬀects the price, just as in our model bidders foresee how their action aﬀects their probability of winning,
this distinction is merely interpretative.
1information, even when their estimate is high, and prefer to win half of the time at such a low price, rather than
break the tie in their favor and divulge thereby some of their information.
This result may appear surprising to the reader familiar with Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1983). After
all, these authors establish that, with one-sided incomplete information, information is eventually fully revealed,
and we show that their insight carries over to the inﬁnite-horizon case and to a more general set-up. However, we
also show that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between one-sided incomplete information and two-sided incomplete
information, even if beliefs are degenerate.
Our results imply that, for repeated ﬁrst-price auctions, such as treasury bills, the auctioneer’s revenue from
the sequential procedure is lower than under a one-time batch sale if bidders are patient enough, or alternatively,
the frequency of auctions is very high.
This paper builds on Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1983), which investigates the undiscounted, ﬁnite-
horizon version of this game in which only one player has binary, private information. One of their striking
conclusions is that being uninformed is an advantage if the horizon is long enough. Also, the seller’s expected
revenue is larger under the one-stage batch sale than under the sequential auction if the initial probability of
a high valuation is suﬃciently large. Our results imply that their main conclusions do not rely on backward
induction and remain valid when the horizon is inﬁnite and players are suﬃciently patient, because, as will
be seen, when incomplete information is one-sided, a date T is endogenously determined such that, along any
equilibrium outcome, a high-signalled bidder has revealed his information by time T.
Two other papers are closely related to his one. First, Hausch (1986), building on Ortega-Reichert (1968),
considers a two-person, two stage ﬁrst-price auction with common values. At the beginning of the game, bidders
receive conditionally independent signals about the identical value of the two units. The value of the objects to
the players is additive. Thus, Hausch’s setting corresponds to the two-period, undiscounted symmetric version
of this model (but it is richer inasmuch as signals are not necessarily perfectly informative). He shows that it
is impossible that a high-signalled player’s bid always reveals his signal in the ﬁrst auction. Instead, either he
always conceal his signal in the ﬁrst auction by bidding like a low-signalled player (pooling), or he randomizes
between concealing and revealing his signal in the ﬁrst auction (semi-pooling). When each object is worth one
with probability p,a n d0 otherwise, the second possibility arises for p suﬃciently large.
Second, Bikhchandani (1988) examines a ﬁnitely repeated second-price auction with common values between
two bidders. The value of the objects to the players is additive, and identically and independently drawn from
a common distribution. Both players receive conditionally independent signals about the value of each unit, but
one of the bidders is of one of two possible types (and this is private information). The strong type’s valuation of
any given unit is higher, by a multiplicative constant, than the low type’s valuation. Because winning is especially
bad news for the uninformed player when his opponent may be of the high type, the winner’s curse is intensiﬁed
for the uninformed player, forcing him to submit lower bids in equilibrium. This weakens the winner’s curse for
the informed bidder of the ordinary type and decreases the price he has to pay whenever he wins. The ordinary
type has therefore an initial incentive to mimic the strong type by making high bids.
Finally, a more general analysis of repeated games with incomplete information has been carried out by
Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1966-68).
It may be worthwhile to point out that several goods are sold in repeated ﬁrst-price auctions, such as various
types of government bonds and red Bordeaux wines. See Ashenfelter (1989) for more examples. Pezanis-Christou
(2000) has collected and analyzed evidence from a ﬁsh market with asymmetric buyers (retailers vs. wholesalers).
As he points out, ﬁsh markets are characterized by supply uncertainty.
Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium for the general case of one-sided
incomplete information. Section 4 proves our central result that the unique equilibrium (for large δ)i nt h et w o -
sided case is purely pooling. Section 5 explores the special case with only two types of each bidder, where we are
able to describe the outcomes for general δ, and prove uniqueness in the symmetric case for all δ and all priors p.
Finally, section 6 concludes brieﬂy.
22 The Model
This paper considers an inﬁnitely-repeated game between two risk-neutral bidders, player 1 and player 2.I ne v e r y
period t =0 ,1,...one indivisible unit is sold using a sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction. In case of a tie, each player
wins with equal probability. We assume common values:
Assumption 1: Both bidders value each unit identically.
All units auctioned oﬀ have the same value, represented by the random variable V . That is, we assume perfect
correlation over time:
Assumption 2: The value of the units from one period to the next is perfectly correlated.
Before the game starts, each bidder i (i =1or 2) receives a signal Si concerning the value of the object. The
signal can take m +1diﬀerent values for player 1,a n dn +1 diﬀerent values for player 2,t h a ti s ,S1 ∈ M =
{0,1,...,m}, S2 ∈ N = {0,1,...,n}. Signals are also referred to as types. A high (low) signal is statistical
evidence for a high (low) value of the object. This is formalized by:
Assumption 3:T h ev a r i a b l e sV , S1 and S2 are aﬃliated.
Aﬃliation is developed in Milgrom and Weber. Let x =( v,j,k), x0 =( v0,l,m) be elements of R × M × N.
Let ¯ x and x be respectively the componentwise maximum and componentwise minimum of x and x0.T h e n i f
(V,S1,S 2) has the joint density f, these variables are aﬃliated if, for all x and x0, f (¯ x)f (x) = f (x)f (x0).T h i s
implies that v(j,k) , E [V | S1 = j,S2 = k] is weakly increasing in each of its arguments. Let p(j,k) denote the






and similarly for Ej[v(j,k)]. The last assumption on parameters can be dispensed with at the expense of trivial
complications.
Assumption 4: (i) The function v(j,k) is strictly increasing in each of its arguments; (ii) v(0,0) = 0; (iii)
p(j,k) > 0 for all (j,k) ∈ M × N.
Players maximize their payoﬀ, which is the discounted sum of their proﬁt in each auction, using a common
discount factor δ ∈ [0,1). Therefore, their utility does not exhibit “diminishing marginal returns” for winning
more units. We emphasize that players do not learn the value of a unit upon buying it. Learning, therefore, is
restricted to inferring one’s rival’s information.
The solution concept used is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (P.B.E.). We further wish to prune any equilibrium
which depends on payoﬀ irrelevant information, and therefore assume that continuation play only depends on (all
players’) current beliefs. That is, if there exist two histories after which every type of every player entertains the
same beliefs about its opponent, then the actions that follow these histories are the same as well.2 In addition,
we impose two reﬁnements.
First, we assume “no underbidding”. Under perfect information, if all units are known to be worth v>0,
there exist many equilibria. For instance, for any b ∈ [0,v], there exists an equilibrium in which both players bid
b repeatedly on the equilibrium path. Because our focus is not on collusion per se,w ea s s u m et h a tb i d sa r ea t
least as large as what the unit is commonly known to be worth, conditional on winning. In this example, “no
underbidding” requires bids to be at least v in every period. Note that this reﬁnement beneﬁts the seller, and yet
one of our main ﬁndings is that the auctioneer’s revenue is low.
Second, we assume “no overbidding”. That is, a bidder observing a bid b or b+ (see below for explanation of
+ bids) assigns henceforth, if possible, zero probability to all types of his opponent for which such a bid strictly
exceeds the maximal possible value of a unit, given their type and beliefs.
A bid is a winning bid if it is equal to the highest bid with strictly positive probability. Formally:
Assumption 5:I np e r i o dt,
2If this assumption is not imposed, additional “reputational” equilibria exist, as discussed in the concluding comments.
3(i) (stationarity) Actions chosen only depend on current beliefs.3
(ii) (no underbidding) The lowest winning bid is at least equal, for some player’s type assigned positive
probability, to his expected value of the unit conditional on winning with this bid. Also, if b is an equilibrium
bid, then there is a winning bid no larger than b + ε, for any ε>0.
(iii) (no overbidding) Upon observing a bid b, i’s beliefs assign thereafter zero probability to any type for
whom b is strictly more than the (conditional) essential supremum of V .
Assumptions (i) and (ii) are necessary for our uniqueness result, and other equilibria that can be supported
in their absence are described in the concluding comments. We do not know whether more equilibrium outcomes
are introduced if we drop assumption (iii).
Finally, given our tie-breaking rule, we cannot always guarantee existence under the assumptions above. In
that case, we allow for a bid b+ that is inﬁnitesimally larger than b. One can think of b+ as b “plus a penny”.
Although a player’s utility from a winning bid of b is the same as from a winning bid of b+,ab i do fb+ is strictly
larger than a bid of b, so that the distinction matters in light of Assumption 5(iii). Such a nonstandard bid
b+ is only necessary for b the lowest bid made with positive probability, so that, unless speciﬁed otherwise, all
symbols and commonly used concepts (support, interval, etc.) refer to the real line and its standard structure.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1983) introduce the same idea, and it is indeed exactly in our extension of their
model that we will require it. Any claims of uniqueness that we make for equilibria that utilize nonstandard bids
are, of course, within the class of all strategies using such bids anywhere in the support.
3 One-sided Incomplete Information
Suppose that M has m +1> 1 elements, while N has only one element. Accordingly, we refer to player 1 as the
informed player, or player I,a n dt op l a y e r2 as the uninformed player, or player U,a n dw ew r i t ev(j) instead of
v(j,0),w h e r e(j,0) ∈ M ×N. Given Assumption 5(ii), normalize v(0) to 0. The solution to the one-sided static
model is a special case of the two-sided version (see section 4.3).
Given an equilibrium, let H∗
t be the subset of t−histories Ht (including the null history) that have positive
probability under the equilibrium strategies, and let H0
t ⊆ H∗
t be the set of histories in which the bids of the
informed bidder have been equal to zero for all periods up to t.L e tγt
i be the probability with which player I is
of type i and makes a strictly positive bid in period t, conditional on some ht ∈ H0
t,a n dl e tpt
i be the probability
that player I is of type i, conditional on the same event. Because of 5(i), γt
i does not depend on the speciﬁc
ht ∈ H0













i = pi. By 5(iii), the informed bidder’s type 0 bids 0 with probability one, so that γt











i =0 , ∀ht ∈ H∗
t
ª
,t h a ti s ,Ti is the length
of the longest equilibrium history in which, given that the informed bidder is of type i, all bids by the informed
bidder have been 0.L e t πt
i be the (normalized) payoﬀ of the informed player’s type i from period t on, given
ht ∈ H∗
t .L e tUt denote the uninformed bidding distribution in period t conditional on the same event and πt
U
the corresponding (normalized) payoﬀ. Finally, let St
i be the support of the bid distribution by the informed
player’s i type, in period t, conditional on the same event. Let St = ∪St
i,l e tSt
U be the uninformed player’s bid
distribution support in period t given ht ∈ H0
t and set βt =m a x{x ∈ R | x ∈ St
U}.W ep r o v et h a t :
Theorem 1 ∃δ
0 < 1: ∀δ ∈ (δ
0,1), Ti =m a x j Tj , T<∞,f o ra l li ∈ M\{0}. In addition, limδ→1 T = ∞,
limδ→1 δ
T =1 , limδ→1 π0
U =0 ,a n dlimδ→1 π0
U/π0
i = ∞,a l li.
3Formally, we mean beliefs of all orders (so that the assumption is as weak as possible), but note that in any case we will use this
only when beliefs on one side are [commonly known to be] degenerate.
4This theorem states that, as players become more patient, type i>0 of the informed player can bid 0 in up
to but no more than T periods, where T is independent of his type. Although limδ→1 T = ∞, δ
T → 1,s ot h a t
players’ payoﬀs depend essentially on their payoﬀ after T. Both players’ normalized payoﬀ tends to zero, but the
uninformed bidder still fares better than the informed bidder.
Proof. This result will be proved in several steps.
1. π0
m > 0: by 5(iii), an informed bidder with signal i does not bid more than v(i).I f β0 5 v(m − 1),
then π0
m = (1 − δ)(v(m) − v(m − 1)) > 0.I f β0 >v(m − 1),t h e nβ0 outbids all types of the informed
player but the highest, so that, conditional on winning, the unit is worth at most the (unconditional)
expected value of V , EV, and because the uninformed player could bid 0 instead, β0 5 EV,s ot h a t
π0
m = (1 − δ)(v(m) − EV) > 0 as well.
2. ∀ht ∈ H0
t such that t<T, Ut (0) = 0: indeed, bidding 0+ yields a higher payoﬀ than 0, since, conditional on
the informed bidder’s bid being 0, the unit’s expected value is strictly positive, and the uninformed bidder’s
continuation payoﬀ does not depend on his own bid, by 5(i).
3. Ti < ∞,a l li ∈ M: suppose that Tm = ∞. Then the informed bidder’s type m is willing to bid 0 in
every period, which yields a payoﬀ of 0,a sUt (0) = 0 for all t. This contradicts π0
m > 0,b y( 1 ) .I nt u r n ,
this implies that π0
m−1 = δ
Tm (1 − δ)
¡
v(m − 1) − max
¡P
i<m pt
iv (i),v(m − 2)
¢¢
> 0, so that, by the same
argument, Tm−1 < ∞. An easy induction establishes now the result.
4. ∀ht ∈ H0
t,βt > 0+: otherwise, the lowest, strictly positive type of the informed bidder which still has
positive probability given ht must bid slightly more than βt with probability one, so that the uninformed
bidder could proﬁtably deviate by bidding more.
Let αt =m a x{x ∈ R | x ∈ St}. ∀ht ∈ H0
t,α t > 0+,s i n c eβt > 0+ and the uninformed bidder would gain
otherwise by bidding slightly less than βt.D e ﬁne also τ =i n f{t ∈ N;βt ∈ St
1}.
5. If b ∈ St
1, b>0,t h e n(0,b) ⊂ St
1: otherwise, there exists either some interval I ⊆ (0,b), I ∩ St = ∅,o r
there exists b0 ∈ (0,b) such that j =m i n{k ∈ M | b0 ∈ St
k} > 1. The former is impossible by the standard
argument (at least one of the players bidding just slightly above I would gain by bidding less), and the
second would violate the payoﬀ’s single-crossing property, given that the informed bidder’s type 1 (resp.
type j) has no continuation payoﬀ from bidding b (resp. b0).
6. ∀1 5 t 5 T, Ut (0+) >U t−1 (0+):o t h e r w i s e ,i fUt−1 (0+) = Ut (0+),t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 suﬃciently small
so that the informed player’s lowest type bidding ε in period t would gain from bidding ε in period t − 1
instead. This implies that, in particular, for ε>0 suﬃciently small, ε ∈ S
t−1
1 implies that ε ∈ St
1:o t h e r w i s e
one derives a contradiction as in (5) by considering ε ∈ S
t−1
1 and ε ∈ St
j,f o rj =m i n{k ∈ N | b ∈ St
k} > 1.
7. T1 = T:i fb ∈ St
1, b>0,a n dt<T,t h e n(0,b) ⊂ St
1 by (5), and (6) implies that, for ε>0 small, ε ∈ S
t+1
1 .
8. τ<∞.I f maxi>1 Ti <T , then this is obvious. If not, it must also be that βT ∈ ST
1 : Suppose not, that
is, suppose that γ =m a x
©
x ∈ R | x ∈ ST
1
ª
<β .B yd e ﬁnition of T, γ>0. Recall that by (5), this implies
that (0,γ) ⊂ ST
1 , and therefore, for every b<γ , the uninformed player’s posterior upon observing such
a bid assigns positive probability to type 1. For all ε>0 suﬃciently small, there exists a lowest type j
(possibly depending on ε) of the informed player for which γ + ε is in his bidding support. We claim that
there exists ε small enough so that this type j would beneﬁt from bidding γ−ε instead of γ+ε.B e c a u s eUT
is continuous on (γ − 2ε,γ +2 ε),i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that the continuation payoﬀ from bidding γ − ε is
bounded away from zero (because j is the lowest type bidding γ+ε, his continuation payoﬀ from such a bid
i sz e r o ) .T h i si st r i v i a li ft y p e1 is the only type bidding γ −ε, and follows from straightforward arguments
in general (the bid support of the uninformed player in such a subgame has v(1) has a lower extremity, and
5its distribution function, evaluated, say, at [v(1) + v(j)]/2 is bounded away from zero, ensuring that such
a bid yields strictly positive proﬁtt ot y p ej).
9. limδ→1 δ
T−τ =1 . Clearly, ∀ε>0, |αt − βt| <εfor all t, ht ∈ H0
t (the lowest type of the player bidding the
higher of the two would gain by bidding less). In addition, neither player’s bidding distribution can have
an atom at the maximum of its support: if the uninformed bidder had such an atom, the informed bidder’s
lowest type j for which αt ∈ St
j would gain by bidding αt + ε instead; if the informed bidder had, then
because all informed bidder’s types j making such a bid must have valuation v(j) >β t, the uninformed
bidder would gain by bidding βt + ε instead, for ε>0 small enough. Therefore, if the uninformed bidder
bids βt, he wins with probability one. For any t such that τ 5 t 5 T,a n da n yht ∈ H0
t, βt must be
decreasing in t, because if βt <β t+1, the lowest type of the informed bidder ’s type i whose support S
t+1
i
includes βt+1 would strictly gain from bidding βt in period t instead. Because the uninformed bidder is
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so that, if βt >εall t ∈
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0 + ˆ Tε/v(m), so that ˆ T 5 v(m)κ/ε. Hence,
for all ε>0, πτ
1 = (1 − δ)δ
v(m)κ/ε (v (1) − ε), which tends to (1 − δ)(v(1) − ε),a sδ tends to 1. Because
this argument is independent of ε, πτ
1/(1 − δ) → v(1) as δ → 1, and because the informed bidder’s type 1
is willing to bid 0 instead for T − τ additional periods, it must be that limδ→1 δ
T−τ =1 .
10. τ =0 : otherwise, the lowest type bidding βτ−1 after a history hτ−1 ∈ H0
τ−1 w o u l ds t r i c t l yg a i nf r o mb i d d i n g
0 in the following T − τ +1periods, given the arguments developed in (8).
11. limδ→1 δ
T =1follows from (8) and (10).
12. limδ→1 T = ∞: because limδ→1 π0
i/(1 − δ) = v(i) for all i ∈ M by (11), it must be that limδ→1 αt =0
∀ht ∈ H0
t, and therefore also limδ→1 βt =0 , implying that limδ→1 γt




i.I flimδ→1 T<∞,t h e nlimδ→1 pT
i = p0
i, ∀i ∈ M. Hence, by deﬁnition of T, limδ→1 γT
i =
p0






iv(i) which does not tend to zero, a contradiction.
The other conclusions follow immediately from (11) and (12). ¥
4 Two-sided Incomplete Information
Suppose now that both M and N have at least two elements. In this section, we establish that there exists a
unique equilibrium outcome if players are suﬃciently patient. On the equilibrium path, both players fully pool:
they bid λ independently of their type, where λ is deﬁned as
λ =m i nhEk[v(0,k)],E j[v(j,0)]i.
Thus λ is the smallest expected value that any type of any player has for the object.
64.1 Existence
Theorem 2 ∃δ
0 < 1: ∀δ ∈ (δ
0,1), it is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) outcome (satisfying our assump-
tions) for all types of both players to bid λ forever along the equilibrium path.
Proof. If beliefs are one-sided degenerate on either type m or type n, the equilibrium play is as in the
one-sided model described in the previous section (not pooling). If beliefs are one-sided degenerate on some lower
type k of player 2 (say), then there is instead a pooling equilibrium at the bid λ = v(0,k). This shows clearly the
distinction between knowledge and belief! To see that such an equilibrium exists, simply assume that any player
who bids more than λ is thought to be the highest type possible (of that player), so that bids immediately jump.
For large enough δ, this leads to payoﬀs that are essentially zero (at most), whereas all types of both players
(except player 1 type 0) are making strictly positive proﬁts along the equilibrium path (that are bounded away
from zero independently of δ). For type 10, who expects zero proﬁts anyway, bidding above λ leads to a loss in
the current period (because his expected value for the good is precisely λ) and continuation payoﬀso fe x a c t l y
zero (since all bids from then on will be above his value), so there is no incentive for him to deviate either.
In the general two-sided case with non-degenerate beliefs, we can use similar strategies to support the equi-
librium. Assume that any player bidding above λ is believed thereafter to be of the highest type (i.e. either m
or n respectively), leading to the one-sided equilibrium of the last section and hence continuation payoﬀst h a t
approach zero (for both players), at most, as δ goes to 1. Since all but possibly the lowest types of each player are
making proﬁts that are bounded away from zero (independently and hence uniformly in δ) in equilibrium, they
will not deviate. But exactly analogously to above, any low type making zero proﬁt sc a no n l yl o s eb yo v e r b i d d i n g
in the current period, and will face continuation payoﬀs of zero anyway, so has no reason to deviate either.
To see that these updating protocols satisfy our reﬁnements, ﬁrst note that λ is exactly the minimum bid
required by 5(ii). The extreme updating (degenerate on the highest type) is stricter than that required by 5(iii),
but goes in the same direction and certainly does not violate it. This particular updating is not unreasonable
(the highest type has the strongest incentive to try to win at any stage), but note that the equilibrium outcome
survives with much weaker protocols: any revised distribution that ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the prior
(i.e. such that high bids are “good news” about your opponent’s type) will lead to larger expected values and
thus a higher pooling bid in the continuation. For high enough δ, this outweighs any possible one-shot gains.
Finally, stationarity is clear.
4.2 Uniqueness
There are important diﬀerences between the true one-sided asymmetric information case considered above, and a
two-sided asymmetric environment with degenerate beliefs on one player, which is what we now turn to. Let us
refer to the support of the equilibrium bid distribution of player i’s type k as player i’s type k bidding support, and
to the union of these over all types k (in the support of his opponent’s beliefs) as player i’s bidding support. We
introduce the additional requirement that for each player i =1 ,2,p l a y e ri’s bidding support should be connected.
Observe that this does not require that player i’s type k bidding support be connected, nor does it impose any
restriction whatsoever on the relationship between bids and types. This assumption rules out some equilibria
that we ﬁnd unconvincing, an example of which is brieﬂy described in the concluding comments.
Assumption 5 (iv) (connected supports) Each player i’s bidding support is connected.
The intuition behind the proofs of the following results is fairly straightforward. For the case of degenerate
beliefs on one player, if the informed player I is not pooling then he must be making a range of bids. In that
case the uninformed player U is doing the same, so I enjoys no ﬂow payoﬀ from pooling. Hence there is a last
period in which he is willing to pool, but that implies that at least one type of player I would prefer to cheat and
m i m i ct h el o wt y p ef r o mt h e no nr a t h e rt h a ns e p a r a t ea n db et h en e wl o wt y p e( w i t hz e r op a y o ﬀ). In the general
two-sided case, the basic idea is that separating will lead to either more optimistic beliefs by the other player
7and thus a higher pooling bid level in the future (which oﬀsets any one-shot gains for large δ) or to the one-sided
equilibrium of section 3 in which both players make arbitrarily low payoﬀ for large δ. Even if your opponent is
planning to separate (which is deﬁnitely bad for you, but of course you have no way to aﬀect it), your best option
is to pool and keep the new pooling bid relatively low (or in the worst case receive ΠI, which is still your best
outcome if he does fully reveal as a high type).
Theorem 3 ∃δ
0 < 1: ∀δ ∈ (δ
0,1), if beliefs are one-sided degenerate (not on type m or n), then the pooling
outcome of Theorem 2 is the unique outcome among all PBE satisfying our assumptions.
Proof. Recall that if beliefs are degenerate on one of the highest types (m or n), then we play as in the
true [with certainty] one-sided equilibrium of section 3, in particular not pooling. Here, for concreteness, we take
beliefs to be one-sided degenerate on some type k<nof player 2. In this case, the minimum expected value λ
(as deﬁned previously) is v(0,k). We proceed in several steps.
1. Player 1 type 0 bids only λ after any history and makes no proﬁt: by 5(ii) no type of any player will ever
bid less than λ,s ot h et y p e0 can never hope for positive proﬁts. By bidding above λ, he risks winning (because
λ + ε is a winning bid by 5(ii)) and thereby making a loss.
2. If all types of player 1 use the same bid distribution strategy (not necessarily stationary), then it is
degenerate on λ at all times (this follows immediately from 1) and player 2 does the same thing: ﬁrst we note
that by stationarity player 2 will have the same strategy in every period. Player 2 cannot bid strictly above λ
with probability one or player 1 would never win and would thus make zero proﬁts (whatever his type), which
is impossible. If player 2 bids both λ and b>λwith positive probability, then by connectedness (i.e. 5(iv)) he
also bids λ+ε with positive probability, for any ε>0 small enough. However, he would then strictly prefer such
ab i dλ + ε to the bid λ (since player 1 puts a mass at λ and player 2’s continuation value is the same for all
equilibrium bids), a contradiction. So player 2 bids λ with probability one instead, as claimed.
3. If there is ever any period t in which all types of player 1 (in the support of player 2’s beliefs) bid only
λ, then both players do so from then on: this follows directly from 2 and stationarity, noting that beliefs do not
change after such a period t.
4. Let βt be the maximum over the bidding supports of players 1 and 2 in period t, assuming that player
1 has bid only λ so far (if not, we have a new lowest type for player 1 and a new lowest bid λ
0). Then βt >λ
implies that player 2 puts no weight on λ (in period t): certainly player 2 is not bidding only λ, otherwise the
lowest type of player 1 who bids above λ (and who then receives zero continuation payoﬀ)w o u l dw a n tt ob i da n
arbitrarily small amount above λ. In fact, this implies that 2’s connected support must have λ as its inﬁmum.
But given that player 2 does bid above λ in equilibrium, the same reasoning as above shows that player 2 would
strictly prefer to bid just above λ than at λ.
5. We cannot have βt >λfor an inﬁnite number of periods: if so, by 3, it would have to hold in every period,
but that would mean that at least some type j>0 of player 1 was willing to bid λ in every period and always
lose (by 4). This would yield zero proﬁts, a contradiction.
6. There can be no last period T in which βT >λ : by the same reasoning as in 2,p l a y e r2 must bid λ from
period T +1on (note that this argument depended on the existence of types j>0 of player 1, but without them
5(iii) still implies that player 2 won’t bid above λ). But now consider the smallest type of player 1 who bids above
λ with positive probability in period T. Such a bid leads to zero continuation payoﬀ for this type, so for large δ
he would strictly prefer instead to pool at λ from period T on.
7. Putting 5 and 6 together, we conclude that there can be no period in which βt >λ .S op l a y e r1 always
bids λ and, by 2, we’re done.
To obtain uniqueness in the two-sided case when beliefs are nondegenerate, the aﬃliation property must be
strengthened. More precisely, we assume henceforth that types are conditionally independent, as is often assumed
in the literature with common-values.
8Assumption 3’:T h ev a r i a b l e sS1 and S2 are pairwise aﬃliated with V , but, conditional on a realization of
V , they are independent.
Lemma ∃δ
0 < 1: ∀δ ∈ (δ
0,1), if beliefs are two-sided nondegenerate and the support of beliefs never changes
along the equilibrium path, then under Assumptions 1-2,3’,4-5, any equilibrium must involve full pooling (i.e. both
players’ bidding supports are degenerate).
Proof. Let µj (k) be the probability assigned by player 1’s type j to his opponent being of type k. Because of
independence, µj (k) is independent of j. So suppose that both type j and type j0 >jare indiﬀerent between all
equilibrium bids, as they must be if the support of player 2’s beliefs does not change. Consider the two strategies
consisting in always submitting the highest such bid, and always submitting the lowest such bid. Let the total
discounted expected payment from such strategies be respectively ¯ b and b.4 Let pk (b) be the total expected
discounted probability that player 1 wins against player 2’s type k when 1 employs the strategy that corresponds
to the payment b = ¯ b, b.N o t et h a tt h i si st h es a m en u m b e rf o rj and j0 since they agree on player 2’s strategy




























¢¯ b − pk (b)b
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(v(j0,k) − v(j,k)) = 0.
Now note that if ¯ b 6= b,t h e npk
¡¯ b
¢
>p k (b) for all k because ¯ b corresponds to strictly higher bids and all types of
player 2 are making all equilibrium bids with positive probability (by Theorem 4). But v(i,k) is strictly increasing
in i by Assumption 4, so we have a contradiction unless ¯ b = b, which implies that player 1 is fully pooling on one
bid. The same argument works for player 2, and then it is immediate that these two bids are the same (and they
both must equal λ by assumption 5(ii) as before).
Theorem 4 ∃δ
0 < 1: ∀δ ∈ (δ
0,1), if beliefs are two-sided nondegenerate, then the only PBE outcome satisfying
our assumptions is the pooling equilibrium described in Theorem 2.
Proof. By the lemma and the obvious fact that players can’t fully pool at any bid other than λ,i ts u ﬃces to
show that the support of beliefs never changes, i.e. that every equilibrium bid by player i is made by all types of
that player. We proceed by induction on m+n. In particular, any bid that is not made by all types immediately
leads to the relevant full pooling equilibrium via the inductive hypothesis. By Theorems 1 and 3,w em a ya s s u m e
the ﬁrst step of the induction.
[Proof under revision; most recent version available from the authors upon request.]
4.3 Static Benchmark
Because we have established that the equilibrium outcome is pooling when the discount factor is close to one,
and the expected revenue is therefore simply v(0,0), it may be useful to give the corresponding expected revenue
for the case of a one-stage batch sale, that is, to solve for the static expected revenue. Consider the case in
which δ =0 , that is, bidders play the static, ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction in every period. It is not known
4Note that these strategies do not necessarily yield the maximum and minimum expected discounted probabilities of winning
against player 2’s strategy.
9whether an equilibrium of such an auction exists under Assumptions 1, 3 and 4. One has to assume further either
that: (i) M = N and p(i | j)=p(j | i) ∀i,j ∈ M (see Hausch (1987) for details); (ii) types are (conditionally)
independently distributed; or (iii) M and N have at most two elements.
Under assumption (i), Hausch has derived explicit formulae for the ex ante proﬁts to each player. Strategies are
symmetric, although this assumption does not imply that the model is symmetric. Under assumption (ii), Wang
(1991) has characterized the equilibrium, provided the model is symmetric. Maskin and Riley (2000, Proposition
2) prove existence of a monotonic equilibrium when ties are broken using a Vickrey auction. An equilibrium is
monotonic, if, for any two types i>i 0 of any player, bi ∈ Si, bi0 ∈ Si0 implies bi = bi0,w h e r eSi, Si0 are the
supports of the bidding distributions of, respectively, type i and type i0. We now give a complete characterization
of this (unique) monotonic equilibrium under independence. Without loss of generality, we normalize v(0,0) to
0.
Because there are only two players, the supports of the bidding distributions of two diﬀerent types of the same
player intersect in one point if these types are consecutive. For each player and every pair of consecutive types
of this player, let α(k) be this bid, where arguments are picked in any way such that α(1) 5 ···5 α(m + n).
Let S1
i denote the support of the bid distribution of player 1’s type i, and analogously S2
j for player 2’s type j.
If k is the index that corresponds to the intersection of the supports of player 1’s (resp. player 2’s) type i and
i +1(resp. type j and j +1 ), let m(k)=i +1and n(k)=m a x
©






i ∈ N | α(k) ∈ S1
i
ª
). Let α(0) = 0, m(0) = n(0) = 0, and denote the highest bid in either player’s
support by α(m + n +1 ) .L e tp(i) (resp. q (j)) be the probability that player 1 (resp. player 2)i so ft y p ei (resp.
of type j), and let Fm(k) (resp. Gn(k)) be the bid distribution of player 1’s type m(k) (resp. player 2’s type n(k))




l=0 q(l),a n dd e ﬁne recursively s(·) by s(0) = 0 and, for
all 1 5 k 5 m + n +1 :
s(k)=m i n{x 5 1 | x = P (i) >s(k − 1) for some i,o rx = Q(j) >s(k − 1) for some j},
Let v(k) , v(m(k),n(k)). We show in Appendix that α(·) can be deﬁne recursively by α(0) = 0, and, for all




(s(l +1 )− s(l))v(l).
Finally, denote the expected revenue by R. We prove in the Appendix that:





2 (v(l +1 )− v(l)),
and the distribution functions used by the players are given by, for b ∈ [α(k),α(k +1 ) ] ,
p(m(k))Fm(k) (b)=s(k +1 )






q (n(k))Gn(k) (b)=s(k +1 )






5T h e 2 x 2 c a s e
To gain further understanding into the dynamic game for arbitrary discount factors, we restrict attention in what
follows to the 2x2 case, that is, m = n =1 .W ec o n s i d e rﬁrst the case in which the model is symmetric, and we
10restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria. First it is necessary, however, to give a detailed description of the
equilibrium in the one-sided subgame that can arise in the 2x2 case.
5.1 The One-Sided Case
Before developing the analysis, it may be helpful to point out one source of equilibrium multiplicity. As we have
seen in the second step of the proof for the general one-sided case of the proof, the uninformed bidder does not
bid v(0) = 0 with positive probability in any period t<T,w h e r eT is the maximal number of consecutive periods
in which the informed bidder with a higher signal may bid zero on the equilibrium path. This follows from the
observation that, as continuation play does not depend on the uninformed player’s bid, bidding ε>0 for ε small
enough strictly dominates bidding 0, since, by bidding 0, the uninformed bidder only wins with probability 1
2 an
object that is worth, conditional on winning with such a bid, strictly more. This is not true in period T,i nw h i c h ,
conditional on winning with a bid of zero, the object is worthless. Therefore, the uninformed bidder may bid zero
with discrete probability in this period, and this speciﬁcation is to some extent arbitrary. Of course, this aﬀects
the incentives of the high-signalled bidder to mimic the low-signalled one, and therefore the speciﬁc equilibrium
strategies. For any such speciﬁcation for period T, one can uniquely solve for the equilibrium strategies (in
particular, derive what T is). We have therefore a continuum of equilibria, but this multiplicity vanishes as δ
tends to one. To ﬁx idea and highlight that this is the only source of multiplicity under our maintained assumption,
we assume henceforth that, in period T as in the previous periods, the uninformed bidder bids zero with zero
probability (conditional on observing only bids of zero so far by the informed bidder).
We normalize v(0) = 0, v(1) = 1,a n dl e tp = p(1). If the informed bidder gets a low signal, he bids 0 in every
period. Therefore, as soon as a strictly positive bid is observed, bids are 1 from then on (“no underbidding”).
It remains to determine strategies for histories such that all bids by the informed player have been zero so far,
a n da l ln o t a t i o n st h a tf o l l o wa r ec o n d i t i o n e do ns u c hah i s t o r y .W el e tpt be the probability that the value is 1
in period t.B yd e ﬁnition p0 = p,w h i c hw ea s s u m ei n[0,1) to avoid trivialities. We deﬁne βt to be the highest
bid in the support of either player, Ht to be bid distribution in period t used by the informed bidder with a high
signal, and Ut to be the bid distribution in period t used by the uninformed bidder. We claim that:
1. if 1 − pt <δ , then the informed player with high valuation must bid 0 with strictly positive probability. If
he does not, then given his equilibrium bid, his continuation payoﬀ is zero (because his valuation will be
known) and his payoﬀ in period t must therefore be his payoﬀ in the static auction given beliefs pt,t h a ti s
1−pt. On the other hand, by bidding 0 instead, he will be able to win the unit in period t+1at negligible
cost, as the uninformed bidder will wrongly believe that he faces an informed player with low valuation.
His payoﬀ f r o md o i n gs oi st h e r e f o r eδ, which must be lower than his equilibrium payoﬀ, an immediate
contradiction.
2. If 1 − pt = δ, then the informed bidder with high valuation cannot bid 0 with positive probability. If he
did, his payoﬀ (in period t) would be strictly bounded above by δ, as he can have a strictly positive reward
in at most one period, this reward is strictly lower than one given that he must make a strictly positive bid
to win, and this reward can come no sooner than in period t +1 .
3. The equilibrium sequence {pt} is weakly decreasing and gets below 1 − δ in ﬁnite time. This follows from
observations 1 and 2, Bayes’ rule, the obvious fact that an informed bidder with low valuation bids zero
in equilibrium, and the fact that the informed bidder with high valuation is only willing to bid zero with
positive probability ﬁnitely many times. The last point follows from the fact that his payoﬀ in the initial
period is bounded below by 1−q,a n dh i sp a y o ﬀ in the initial period is bounded above by δ
t,w h e r et is the
number of initial periods during which he is willing to bid zero with positive probability.
We can now explicitly solve for the equilibrium strategies. Let T denote the ﬁrst period t in which 1−pt = δ.
11Because the informed bidder with high valuation is willing to bid 0 before, we must have, for t<T,





1 − βt = δ
T−t (1 − βT)
In addition, because of Bayes’ rule,




In period T, as the ‘static’ auction is played, we must have pT = βT, and of course p0 = p. We can therefore
solve for 1 − pT.
1 − pT =








δ (1 − βT)δ
2 (1 − βT)···δ




T(T+1)/2 (1 − pT)
T ,
and thus:
1 − pT =( 1− p)
1/(T+1) δ
−T/2.
Also, 1 − pT−1 = δ (1 − pT)
2. Therefore, T must satisfy 1 − pT = δ and δ (1 − pT)
2 <δ , i.e. 1 − pT < 1,t h a ti s :
δ









partition the unit interval, this deﬁnes T =m i n
n
t ∈ N;1− p = δ
(T+1)(T+2)/2
o
and establishes its existence and uniqueness. Observe that, in accordance with the results proved above more
generally, limδ→1 T = ∞, but limδ→1 δ







− (1 − pt).
In this simple example, we can solve for the equilibrium payoﬀ of the players, and study the expected bid
trajectory. For the payoﬀ,w eg e t :
ΠI (p)=( 1 − δ)δ
T/2 (1 − p)
1
T+1 ,

















where ΠI (p) and ΠU (p) are the (initial) payoﬀs of the informed high-signalled player and the uninformed player,
respectively, given belief p.W e o b s e r v e t h a t ΠI (p) is continuous and decreasing in p and in δ, ΠI (0) = 1 − δ,
limp→1 ΠI (p)=0 ,a n dΠI (p).A sf o rΠU, it is continuous and increasing in p, ΠU (p)=0 , limp→1 ΠU (p)=1 ,
but limδ→1 ΠU (p)=0 .
Finally, we study the variations of the expected bids. The expected maximum bid (conditional, as usual, on




T−t (1 − pT)
´2
,
which is decreasing in t.T h eunconditional expectation of the winning bid in period t = 1, t 5 T, Ft,i sg i v e nb y :
Ft =1− δ
T ¡








T−t (1 − pT)
´2¶
,
which is decreasing in t as well. Of course, for t>T, it is equal to the prior, p, and is larger than the corresponding
expectation for all t 5 T. Details for all of the calculations above can be found in the Appendix.
125.2 The Symmetric Case
Symmetry is deﬁned as p(j,k)=p(k,j), v(j,k)=v(k,j), for all j ∈ M, k ∈ N.L e tp = p(Si =1| S−i =1 )
be the probability that a player’s opponent has a high signal given that the player has observed a high signal.
We assume furthermore that types are independently distributed and normalize v(1,1) = 2, v(0,0) = 0 and
set v(0,1) = 1. W eh a v ev e r i ﬁed that the analysis can be made without independence and with arbitrary
v(0,1) ∈ (v(0,0),v(1,1)), but there is very little to be gained from such generality, and notation becomes
signiﬁcantly more cumbersome. Let us call an equilibrium separating if it involves the low types of each player
bidding 0 and the high types continuously randomizing over [0,β], semi-pooling if low types bid a common bid
p0, while high types randomize on [p0,β] with an atom at p0,a n dpooling if both types make a common bid p0.
As mentioned before, we restrict attention to equilibria in which equilibrium strategies are symmetric (as long as
information remains nondegenerate two-sided incomplete). In the subgames of one-sided incomplete information
following separation by a high type (who is now the uninformed), we follow the equilibrium described in the
previous subsection, but witha l lb i d ss h i f t e du p w a r db y1 due to 5(ii).
Theorem 6 For all δ, the equilibrium strategies are unique. For δ<1/2, the equilibrium is separating if 1−p =
2δ, and semi-pooling otherwise. For δ>1/2, the equilibrium is pooling if ΠU (p) 5 δ − 1/2, and semi-pooling
otherwise.
This theorem is illustrated in the next ﬁgure.
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full separation semipooling
pooling semipooling
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Proof. For a separating equilibrium to exist, the only incentive constraint to verify is that high types have no
incentive to mimic low types. By deviating, a high type gets a payoﬀ of (1 − δ)(1− p)/2+δ (1 − δ). By abiding
by the equilibrium strategy, he gets (1 − δ)(1− p). Therefore, it is necessary and suﬃcient that 2δ 5 1 − p.F o r
a pooling equilibrium to exist, the only incentive constraint to verify is that a high type does not want to deviate
13and bid slightly more. By deviating, he can get up to 1−δ +δΠU (p), and by abiding by the equilibrium, he gets
1
2. Therefore, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a pooling equilibrium to exist is that 1 − δ + δΠU (p) 5 1
2.
Consider now a semi-pooling equilibrium. Let γ be the probability that one’s opponent is of the high type
and makes a bid larger than p0 (a separating bid), which is both the lowest bid (the pooling bid) and the posterior
belief about the opponent’s type, conditional on the pooling being observed. Then, for high types to be indiﬀerent
between the pooling bid and a slightly higher bid, we need:








payoﬀ from bidding p0
(5)
=( 1 − γ)
¡
(1 − δ)+δΠU (p0)
¢
| {z }
payoﬀ from bidding p0
+
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1 − p =
δΠI (p0)
(1 − δ) 1
2 + δ (ΠU (p0)+ΠI (p0) − V (p0))




1 − δ + δΠU (p0)
¢
(1 − δ) 1
2 + δ (ΠU (p0)+ΠI (p0) − V (p0))
.
We show that such an equilibrium cannot exist for δ<1/2 and 2δ 5 1−p (the latter clearly implies the former),
nor can it exist for δ = 1/2 and 1 − δ + δΠU (p) 5 1
2 (same remark). Consider the ﬁrst case. Observe that
a (decreasing) sequence (p,p0,p 00,...) of consecutive semi-pooling equilibria cannot have an accumulation point,
for by picking a term arbitrarily far in the sequence, its value V (p) would be arbitrarily close to 1
2, while the
deviation payoﬀ for a high type would be arbitrarily close to 1−δ +δΠU (p) > 1
2, a contradiction (this argument
covers also the case where the alleged accumulation point is 0); therefore, any sequence of consecutive equilibria
must have a largest term, after which, by necessity, the equilibrium is separating. Pick the largest such term.
Equation (5) implies that








Because ΠI (p0) 5 1 − δ and ΠU (p0) = 0,t h i sr e q u i r e s




However, this is impossible if 2δ<1−p, and only possible for 2δ =1−p if p0 =0 , that is, if the equilibrium is in
fact separating. Consider now the second case. Suppose ﬁrst that there is a sequence (p,p0,p 00,...) with inﬁnitely
many terms that are semi-pooling. Then we can pick terms such that the payoﬀ must be arbitrarily close to 1/2
and 1−δ +δΠU (p), implying that the limit of such a sequence cannot be such that 1−δ +δΠU (p) < 1
2.W ec a n
then suppose without loss of generality that, if a semi-pooling exists with 1 −δ + δΠU (p) < 1
2, then (conditional
on both players making a pooling bid), players pool (forever) at belief p0. Equation (5) then implies that





1 − δ + δΠU (p0)
¢
,( 5 ’ )
14which is impossible because 1−δ +δΠU (p0) < 1−δ +δΠU (p) < 1
2,a n dΠI (p0) = 0. In fact, the same argument
rules out a semi-pooling equilibrium with p such that 1 − δ + δΠU (p)=1
2. This establishes the second claim. It
may be worthwhile at this point to observe that, if semi-pooling equilibria exists for 1−δ+δΠU (p) > 1
2, then the
sequence of continuation plays (conditional on players making the pooling bid) is an inﬁnite sequence consisting
exclusively of semi-pooling equilibria. If there is a limit, it must obviously satisfy 1 − δ + δΠU (p)=1
2,s ot h i s
limit is unique. As pooling equilibria cannot exist for 1 − δ + δΠU (p) > 1
2, all we have to show is that such a
sequence cannot be ﬁnite, i.e. such that there exists p, after which (conditional on both players making pooling
bids) the equilibrium is pooling (i.e., p0 is such that 1 − δ + δΠU (p0) 5 1
2). This immediately follows from (5’).
We are left with establishing existence (and uniqueness) of semi-pooling equilibria for δ<1/2 and 2δ>1−p,
as well as for δ>1/2 and 1 − δ + δΠU (p) > 1
2. As shown, if such a semi-pooling equilibrium exists, then it
must belong to a sequence of semi-pooling equilibria which is ﬁnite in the ﬁrst case, ending up with a separating
equilibrium, and inﬁnite in the second case, converging to the unique p solving 1 − δ + δΠU (p)=1
2.
Consider ﬁrst δ<1/2 and 2δ>1 − p. We show that (6) determines uniquely (V (p),p) as a function of
(V (p0),p 0), and that the (ﬁrst coordinate of the) sets of consecutive solutions of (6), with boundary conditions
given by (p,(1 − δ)(1− p)) for p ∈ (0,1 − 2δ] partition (1 − 2δ,1). To see this, suppose that V (p0) is decreasing
in p0 and smaller than (1 − δ). It follows from the ﬁrst equation of (6) that (1 − p)/(1 − p0) is decreasing in p0.
This follows from the fact that
(1 − δ) 1
2 + δ
¡







(1 − δ) 1
2 − δV (p0)
δΠI (p0)
is increasing (ΠU and 1/ΠI is increasing and positive, and so is (1 − δ) 1
2 − δV (p0),b e c a u s e1
2 >δ ,a n d ,b y
hypothesis, (1 − δ) = V (p0),a n dV (p0) is decreasing. The fact that is (1 − p)/(1 − p0) is decreasing in p0 implies

















as δΠI (p0) 5 (1 − δ) 1
2 5 (1 − δ) 1
2 + δV (p0),a n db o t hδΠI (p0) and (1 − δ) 1
2 + δV (p0) are decreasing in p0,t h a t
V (p) decreases with p0 (as a weighted average of two decreasing functions with increasing weight on the smaller
one).Because V (p) is decreasing, it follows in particular that V (p) 5 1−δ,p r o v i d e dt h a tV is continuous, which
follows by induction as well once it is established for the ﬁr s ti t e r a t i o n .I ti si m m e d i a t et ov e r i f yt h a tf o rp0 = ε>0
arbitrarily small, and associated V (p0)=( 1− δ)(1− p0),t h e r ee x i s t s(p,V (p)) solving (6) arbitrarily close to
(1 − 2δ,2δ (1 − δ)). B e c a u s e( t h ep r o j e c t i o no nt h eﬁrst coordinate space of) the image by (6) of the interval
(0,1 − 2δ] is an interval (1 − 2δ,p∗],f o rs o m ep∗ > 1 − 2δ, and the value V is continuous on that interval, it
follows by induction that the intervals of probabilities constructed this way have neither “gaps” nor “overlaps”,
and that V is continuously decreasing in p.O b s e r v et h a t ,a sp0 =1is a ﬁxed point of the ﬁrst equation of (6),
the union of these intervals never stretches above one. Conversely, because, for p0 = 2δ (1 − δ) (which is certainly
a probability that is “reached”, since it belongs to the “ﬁrst” interval),
1 − p =
δΠI (p0)
(1 − δ) 1
2 + δ (ΠU (p0)+ΠI (p0) − V (p0))
(1 − p0) <
1 − p0
1+( 1− δ)(1− 2δ)
,
for any p<1 is eventually included in the union of intervals recursively obtained by application of (6). This
proves that for every p>1 − 2δ, there exists one and only one equilibrium outcome, specifying in particular
that players semi-pool as long as they have pooled, until the common belief p is less than 1 − 2δ,a tw h i c hp o i n t
separation occurs.
15Let us now study the case δ = 1/2 and 1 −δ +δΠU (p) > 1
2.D e ﬁning q =1 /(1 − p), w = V (p)/(1 − p),a n d
f (q)=1− δ + δΠU (1 − 1/q), we get from (6) the following pair of diﬀerence equations
(




wn+1 = f (qn),
where calendar time is reversed, that is, qn corresponds to the posterior belief given semi-pooling and a prior
belief qn+1. Observe that the unique critical point of this system is ¯ x , (¯ q, ¯ w)=
³
(1 − ¯ p)
−1 ,w(¯ p)
´
,w h e r e¯ p is the
unique root of 1 −δ +δΠU (p)=1
2. For later use, observe also that this system is equivalent to the second-order
diﬀerence equation
qn+1 − qn =
(f (qn) − (1 − δ)/2)qn − δf (qn−1)
δΠI (qn)
,
from which it is apparent that qn >q n−1 > ¯ q implies qn+1 >q n > ¯ q (since then (f (qn) − (1 − δ)/2)qn −
δf (qn−1) > (1 − δ)
¡
f (qn) − 1
2
¢
). Computing the Jacobian evaluated at this ﬁxed point, we get:
"
1+
f0(¯ q)¯ q+f(¯ q)−(1−δ)/2





whose roots are real conjugate, one of which has modulus strictly less than one, the other one has modulus strictly
larger than one. Indeed, the discriminant is positive because
³
1+
f0(¯ q)¯ q+f(¯ q)−(1−δ)/2
δΠI(¯ q)
´2
> 4f0 (¯ q)/ΠI (¯ q),a st h e
term which is squared exceeds
¡
1+f0 (¯ q)/ΠI (¯ q)
¢2 (using f (¯ q) − (1 − δ)/2 > 0 and ¯ q/δ > 1), and the ordering
of moduli is easily established using the same bounds. Therefore, ¯ x is a hyperbolic ﬁx e dp o i n t ,t h em a pd e ﬁned
b yt h es y s t e mo fd i ﬀerence equations has a saddle point at ¯ x, and so has its inverse map (the eigenvalues of the
inverse matrix are the inverses of the eigenvalues). By the stable manifold theorem (see Devaney (1989)), there
exists a neighborhood of ¯ x such that, for each q in this neighborhood, there exists a unique w such that the limit
of the system starting from (q,w) is ¯ x.B e c a u s eqn =( 1− pn)
−1 is strictly increasing in pn,a n dwn = f (qn−1)
is similarly increasing in pn−1, we may therefore conclude that, using standard calendar time, there exists a
neigborhood of ¯ p, such that, for each pn in this neighborhood, there exists a unique pn+1 in this neighborhood,
such that the sequence (pk) going consecutively through pn and pn+1 tends to ¯ p.E v i d e n t l y , pn+1 > ¯ p.A s
p−n is monotonic since q−n is, and ¯ p is the unique ﬁxed point of the second-order diﬀerence equation, it follows
that through all points p ∈ (¯ p,1) such a sequence exists, and uniqueness follows from trivial continuity and
monotonicity observations.
5.3 The Asymmetric Case
In this section we extend the case of the diagonal (p1 = p2 = p) to the asymmetric version; WLOG assume
p2 >p 1.F o r δ<1/2 (available from the authors), bidding is fairly complex. Typically, both types of both
players bid on overlapping but non-nested supports. However, we can say that there is continuity with both the
diagonal and the static game, in that as δ goes to 0 the equilibrium play converges to the equilibrium of the static
case. The general version of the static case was described in section 4.3, but for concreteness we spell it out now
for binary types and independent signals.
Assuming that p2 = p1 and δ =0 , denote the c.d.f. of player i by Hi or Li, depending upon whether his
valuation (i.e. signal) is high or low. L2 is degenerate with unit mass at 0, H2 has support [0,p 1 + p2] (with no
atom at 0), H1 has support
h
p2−p1
1−p1 ,p 1 + p2
i






with an atom at 0. Low types have



















1 − p−i − (1 − pi)(1− b)





,p 1 + p2
¸
.
Thus in the symmetric case p1 = p2 = p,b o t hl o wt y p e sb i d0 f o rs u r e ,a n db o t hh i g ht y p e sb i di nt h er a n g e
[0,2p] and make proﬁts of 1 − p. The expected revenue for the auctioneer, in the general case, is p2
1 + p2
2.
We study the δ = 1/2 case in more detail here. For existence, we introduce an endogenous tie-breaking rule.
Recall that we denote 1−δ +δΠU (pi) by f(pi),w i t h¯ p satisfying f(¯ p)=1
2. Then if the bid at which the players
tie is at least ¯ p, they win with equal probability as before. But if their tying bid b is less than ¯ p, we give player 2
as h a r ef(b) < 1
2 a n dw eg i v ep l a y e r1 the remaining share 1−f(b). Given that in equilibrium the pooling bid will
be at the posterior beliefs about player 1, this boils down to giving player 2 exactly his outside option. However,
the rules are of course independent of the players’ beliefs and can be implemented with observable bids only.
First note that the edge p1 =0corresponds to the one-sided case with degenerate beliefs on the low type
of player 1. Here the equilibrium is again pooling (for any p2): both players bid 0 and receive the object with
probability δ and 1 − δ respectively, as above. The high type of player 2 weakly prefers his equilibrium payoﬀ,
namely f(0) = 1 − δ,t oh i sp a y o ﬀ from deviation, which is also 1 − δ ( =( 1− δ) · 1+δ · 0). Similarly, the
uninformed player 1 (low type) prefers δp2 to (1 − δ)p2 as long as δ = 1/2. If the high type of player 1 were
around (which he isn’t!), he would be willing to pool exactly when
δ(1 + p2) = (1 − δ)(1 + p2)+δΠU(p2),o r
(2δ − 1)p2 + δ = f(p2).
For δ<2/3, this yields an upper bound ¯ p2 = ¯ p (with strict inequality as long as δ is strictly larger then 1/2); for
δ = 2/3,i ti ss a t i s ﬁed for any p2. This bound is not crucial at this point, since there is no incentive constraint
for a type who does not exist, but it will arise again below. However, it is the very possibility of a higher type of
player 1 that allows us to support a pooling equilibrium in the ﬁrst place: the diﬀerence between knowledge and
belief.
The equilibrium we consider for the two-sided case (we have not proven uniqueness) involves pooling below
a boundary connecting the diagonal (i.e. the symmetric case) to either the edge that corresponds to p1 =0(for
δ<2/3) or to the edge corresponding to p2 =1(for δ = 2/3). This boundary intersects the diagonal at the
point p =¯ p, so this equilibrium truly does extend that of the symmetric case. It intersects the edge p1 =0(for
δ<2/3) exactly at the point ¯ p2 deﬁned above, and it is monotonic in p1 (for any δ). It is described by the
following expression:
1+( δ − f(p1))(p2 − p1)=f(p1)+f(p2).
Above this boundary line, the players semipool, where the low pooling bid is the posterior belief on player 1’s type.
That is, both high types pool with positive probability and also make revealing bids with positive probability.
They converge toward the pooling region (conditional on no one having yet separated), but do not reach it in
ﬁnite time, just as in the symmetric case. The speciﬁc equations for the evolution of beliefs under semipooling
are given in the Appendix. Of course, given Theorems 2 and 3, as δ approaches 1 the boundary line expands and
the pooling region ﬁlls the entire parameter space. In this case the seller’s [normalized] expected revenue is the
common pooling bid p1, which is certainly lower than the overall expected value of p1 + p2, and may or may not
be lower than the revenue in the static game, p2
1+p2
2. On the other hand, as δ approaches 1/2, the pooling region
shrinks and we have only semipooling in the limit.
We formalize these results in the following theorem, which is proved in the Appendix.
17Theorem 7 For δ = 1/2 and any p2 >p 1 > 0, there is an equilibrium satisfying all our assumptions; it is
characterized by pooling if 1+( δ − f(p1))(p2 − p1) = f(p1)+f(p2) and by semipooling otherwise.
































































































(Conditional) evolution of (p1,p2) (given δ≥1/2)
186 Concluding Comments
This paper shows that in an inﬁnitely repeated, ﬁrst-price, common-value auction in which the value of all units is
perfectly correlated, rational and patient players prefer to make a low, “pooling” bid in every period rather than
divulge any of their proprietary information. We have imposed four reﬁnements in order to prove uniqueness of
this equilibrium outcome. First, stationarity: players bids depend only on beliefs. This assumption is necessary to
eliminate “reputational” equilibria as described in the durable goods monopoly literature (Ausubel and Deneckere
(1989)). Consider for instance the one-sided version of our model (Section 3). By Theorem 1, as the discount factor
tends to one, both the uninformed and the informed bidder’s payoﬀ tend to zero. Then, without stationarity,
there exists a P.B.E. (satisfying the other three reﬁnements) in which both players repeatedly bid v(0) and win
the object with equal probability. The informed bidder has no incentive to deviate if any higher bid is interpreted
as evidence of, say, him being the highest possible type, and the uninformed bidder has no incentive to deviate
either if such a bid triggers a reversion to any equilibrium satisfying Theorem 1. In turn, this makes it possible
to construct other equilibria of the repeated game with two-sided incomplete information. Second, it is necessary
to assume “no underbidding”, that is, that players bid at least as much as the object is commonly believed to be
worth. Otherwise, there exists a continuum of other pooling equilibrium which diﬀer only in the pooling bid, and
our reﬁnement selects the equilibrium with the highest such bid. Third, we assumed that players’ revise their
belief in such a way as to assign zero probability to a player’s type for which the observed bid is more than what
the object could conceivably be worth to him (that is, under his most optimistic conjectures). As mentioned,
w es u s p e c tt h a tt h i st h i r dr e ﬁnement could be dispensed with. Finally, we assumed in section 3.2 that players
(as a union across types) use connected bidding supports. Without this assumption, there is, for instance, an
equilibrium of the one-sided degenerate-belief version of our game in which the informed player always bids λ
(his lowest possible value for the object), and the uninformed player randomizes between λ and precisely the one
bid β>λso that winning with probability 1 at β gives him the same static payoﬀ as winning half the time at λ
(because he would tie). If all out-of-equilibrium bids are interpreted as coming from the highest type and thus
leading to the outcome of Theorem 1, no type of any player has an incentive to deviate. We ﬁnd this equilibrium
somewhat artiﬁcial; connectedness rules it out.
How could an auctioneer eliminate the tacit collusion that our equilibrium suggests? A reserve price is an
instrument that, used wisely, would allow the auctioneer to fare better. If he can commit to a reserve price policy,
then as the discount factor tends to one, his optimal expected revenue tends toward his revenue from setting
an optimal ﬁxed reserve price. Players whose signal is suﬃciently high pool at a level slightly above the reserve
price, while players with lower signals remain idle. Therefore, the auctioneer’s expected revenue is still lower than
in the static auction. Another commonly used procedure in auctioneering is the option to a winner to purchase
future units at the current price (See Cassady (1967)). It is clear that such a procedure eliminates the pooling
equilibrium, as at least one player would have an incentive to bid a penny more and exercise his option. However,
this procedure is not perfect either, as a player with a low signal may exercise his option and win all units at a
price below their real value (assuming that bids are observed before the option decision is made).
As in Kyle and the literature on insider trading, we have restricted attention to the case in which the values of
the units are perfectly correlated. This seems to be the most challenging case for information revelation. Indeed,
suppose that the value of each unit is an independent draw from some (possibly time-dependent) distribution,
for which the static ﬁrst-price auction admits a unique equilibrium. Then the only equilibrium that is stationary
in the repeated game speciﬁes that the static auction be played in each period.
We have also restricted attention to the two player case. We have veriﬁed that the pooling equilibrium remains
an equilibrium satisfying our reﬁnements when there are more than two players, but have not proved uniqueness.
As soon as a single player has revealed his information, all other players’ private information must be eventually
revealed, as such an uninformed bidder cannot be disciplined into pooling (given stationarity) and thus, informed
bidders must eventually act. Such information revelation occurs “quickly” relative to the discount factor, which
in turn allows players to enforce tacit collusion when none of them has revealed any information. The intuition
19for uniqueness appears robust: if none of the opponents reveals his private information, then pooling is certainly
optimal provided the discount factor is high enough, while if some of them do reveal theirs, it is then still better
to pool and become the informed player, for uninformed bidders have a zero payoﬀ as soon as there is more than
one of them.
We have also considered the framework of private values (rather than common) and of second-price auctions
(rather than ﬁrst-price). However, it is clear that much work remains to be done in the domain of repeated
auctions.
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7.1 Static case





q (j)+q (n(k))Gn(k) (α(k))

(α(k +1 )− α(k)) = q (n(k))
¡
Gn(k) (α(k +1 ) )− Gn(k) (α(k))
¢
v(m(k),n(k)),







(α(k +1 )− α(k)) = p(m(k))
¡






Gn(k) (α(k +1 ) )− Gn(k) (α(k))
¢
Pn(k)−1









For k 5 m+n+1,d e ﬁne x(k)=
Pm(k)−1
i=0 p(i)+p(m(k))Fm(k) (α(k)) and y(k)=
Pn(k)−1
i=0 q (j)+q (n(k))Gn(k) (α(k)).
It follows that:
x(k +1 )− x(k)
x(k)
=
y(k +1 )− y(k)
y (k)
,
and thus, because x(m + n +1 ) = y(m + n +1 ) = 1 , x(k)=y(k), for all k 5 m + n +1 . Because for all
α(k +1 ) ,e i t h e rGn(k) (α(k +1 ) )or Fm(k) (α(k +1 ) )equals 1,t h i se s t a b l i s h e st h a ts(k)=x(k) can be deﬁned





s(k)=m i n{x 5 1 | x = P (i) >s(k − 1) for some i,o rx = Q(j) >s(k − 1) for some j},
for all 1 5 k 5 m + n +1 . Obviously, s(m + n +1 )=1 .
Consider again the indiﬀerence of player 2’s type n(k) between bids α(k) and α(k +1 ):
m(k) X
i=0




p(i)(v(i,n(k)) − α(k +1 ) )+p(m(k))Fm(k) (α(k +1 ) )( v (m(k),n(k)) − α(k +1 ) ).




v(m(k),n(k)) − α(k +1 )
v(m(k),n(k)) − α(k)
,




(s(l +1 )− s(l))v(m(l),n(l)).
22I nt h es a m ew a y ,w ed e t e r m i n et h ed i s t r i b u t i o nf u n c t i o n s .I fb ∈ [α(k),α(k +1 ) ] ,
p(m(k))Fm(k) (b)=s(k +1 )






q(n(k))Gn(k) (b)=s(k +1 )






We can now compute the expected revenue R.F o r0 5 k 5 m+n,l e tR(α(k),α(k +1 ) )be the expected revenue
from bids b ∈ [α(k),α(k +1 ) ] .S i n c e
Pn(k)
j=0 q (j)+q (n(k))Gn(k) (b)=
Pm(k)
j=0 p(i)+p(m(k))Fm(k) (b), it follows
that
R(α(k),α(k +1 ) ) = s(k +1 )
2
µ




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α(k+1)
α(k)
= s(k +1 )
2 (2α(k +1 )− v(k)) − s(k)
2 (2α(k) − v(k)),




R(α(k),α(k +1 ) )




















= v(m + n +1 )−
m+n X
l=0





2 (v(l +1 )− v (l)). ¥
7.2 Calculations for binary one-sided
Additional details for the 2x1 case: Deﬁne ΠI (p) and ΠU (p) to be the expected payoﬀ of the informed and
uninformed bidder, respectively, given belief p. Obviously, ΠI (p)=( 1− δ)δ
T (1 − pT)=( 1− δ)δ
T/2 (1 − p)
1
T+1,
with T =m i n
n
t ∈ N;1− p = δ
(T+1)(T+2)/2
o
. It is simple to verify that ΠI (p) is decreasing in p, limp→0 ΠI (p)=
1 − δ, limp→1 ΠI (p)=0 ,a n dΠI (p) is decreasing in δ.O b s e r v e t h a t 1 − pt =
³
δ





and, denoting the odds ratio pt/(1 − pt) by lt,w eh a v e(pt − βt)/pt = lt+1/lt. By bidding 0+ repeatedly, the
uninformed player gets:













































23Observe that, because T =m i n
n




T → 1 as δ → 1. Notice also that

















so that ΠU (p) → 0 as δ → 1.
Finally, we study the variations of the expected bids. Let ht, ut be the densities correspondingly respectively
to the distributions Ht and Ut. The density of the maximum bid, mt,i sg i v e nb y
mt (b)=u(t)(1− pt + ptHt (b)) + ptht (b)Ut (b)=
2δ




and its expectation (conditional, as usual, on the informed bidder having bid 0 up to t − 1)i s
Et =2 δ





























T−t (1 − pT)
´2
,
which is decreasing in t. Next, observe that the unconditional expectation of the winning bid in period t = 1,




(1 − βi)(1− Et)















T−t (1 − pT)
´2¶
,
which is decreasing in t as well. Of course, for t>T, it is equal to the prior, p, and is larger than the corresponding
expectation for all t 5 T.
7.3 Asymmetric binary types
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m7 : If both players fully pool, the common bid will be λ = p1 (using the reﬁnements and the
fact that p1 <p 2). Anyone who bids even λ+ will be considered to be a high type (by ﬁat, but this is in line with
5(iii)). Since p1 5 ¯ p throughout the pooling region, we use the endogenous sharing rule. The low type of player
2 makes zero proﬁt and can do no better. The low type of player 1 makes proﬁts of (1 − f(p1))(p2) >p 2/2 and
by deviating can obtain (1 − δ)(p2)+δ · 0, so he will never wish to deviate. [Recall that f(p)=1− δ + δΠU (p)
and is equal to 1/2 at ¯ p.] The incentive constraint for the high type of player 2 is
f(p1)(1 + p1 − p1) = (1 − δ)(1 + p1 − p1)+δΠU(p1)=f(p1)
24which is always just satisﬁed; this is how the tie-breaking rule was constructed. For player 1, we need
(1 − f(p1))(1 + p2 − p1) = (1 − δ)(1 + p2 − p1)+δΠU(p2).
This determines the boundary of the region where full pooling is an equilibrium. Rearranging, the equation for
the boundary is given by
1+( δ − f(p1))(p2 − p1)=f(p1)+f(p2).
Note that p1 = p2 =¯ p satisﬁes this equality, so the boundary hits the diagonal exactly at ¯ p, as desired. Further-
more, this boundary intersects the edge case p1 =0(where f(p1)=1− δ)w h e n
(2δ − 1)p2 + δ = f(p2),
i.e. at ¯ p2 (as deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n5 . 3f o rδ<2/3). This makes intuitive sense, since that was exactly where the
high type of player 1 w o u l dh a v en ol o n g e rb e e nw i l l i n gt op o o l .F i n a l l y ,ﬁxing p1 and p2 less than 1,i ti sc l e a r
that the RHS of player 1’s original incentive constraint goes to 0 as δ goes to 1. So in the limit for arbitrarily
patient players, we have full pooling for any initial parameter values.
If p1 is too large (given some p2), so that we are outside the boundary of the pooling region, then both players
semipool. Renormalize time as time-to-go until we stop semipooling (conditional on both players pooling), i.e.
until one player either fully separates or fully pools. Recall that semipooling entails players with low valuations
making a low, pooling bid λ (equal to p1,t−1), while high types make the same pooling bid with positive probability,
and with positive probability they continuously randomize over some support [λ+,βt].L e tVi (p1,t,p 2,t) denote
the value for player i with high valuation, given the initial beliefs. Let γi be the probability that player j =3−i








Because player 1 is indiﬀerent between pooling and separating (the ﬁrst equality corresponds to a pooling bid,










((1 − δ) · (1 − f(p1,t−1))(1 + p2,t−1 − p1,t−1)+δV1 (p1,t−1,p 2,t−1))
















δΠI (p1,t−1)=f(p1,t−1)(1− δ)(1+p2,t−1 − p1,t−1)+δ
¡
ΠU (p2,t−1) − V1 (p1,t−1,p 2,t−1)
¢
.










((1 − δ) · f(p1,t−1)+δV2 (p1,t−1,p 2,t−1))

















δΠI (p2,t−1)=( 1 − δ)(1− f(p1,t−1)) + δ
¡
ΠU (p1,t−1) − V2 (p1,t−1,p 2,t−1)
¢
.
25We now proceed as in section 5.2, deﬁning qi =1 /(1 − pi), wi = Vi (p1,p 2)/(1 − p−i), and [slightly abusing
notation] f (qi)=1− δ + δΠU (1 − 1/qi). Then we can rewrite the dynamics above as a set of four diﬀerence
equations 
    
    
q1,t+1 − q1,t =
q1,tf(q1,t)−w2,t
ΠI(q2,t)
















Observe that if q1 and q2 are on the boundary deﬁned above, and if w1 and w2 are the corresponding pooling
values, then we get a ﬁxed point for the entire system (i.e. the RHS of the ﬁrst two equations reduces to zero).
We can again write this as a pair of second-order diﬀerence equations, if we prefer, from which monotonicity is















δΠI(q1) D − 1
ΠI(q1) 0
−(1 − δ)q2/q2
1 f(q2)+( 1− δ)q
−1











2 )) + q2
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.N o wA2−4BH =( 1+2 x+x2)−4x =( 1−x)2,
where x = BH =
f(q1)+q1f0(q1)
ΠI(q2) ,s ot h eﬁrst two eigenvalues simplify to 1 and BH. The product of the remaining
conjugate roots is 1
4(D2 − (D2 − 4EG)) = EG, but since f(qi)=1− δ + δΠU (1 − 1/qi) > 1 − δ>ΠI(q−i)
and f0(qi) > 0,b o t hBH > 1 and EG > 1. Thus at least one of the conjugate pair must have norm greater
than 1, and overall we have at least two eigenvalues larger than 1, with one unit root. The inverse matrix (since
we were working in reverse time) thus has two eigenvalues less than 1, so that we have two stable dimensions.
There is a center manifold from the unit root, but all that we require is at least one stable dimension. Thus, in a
neighborhood of the boundary, given q1 and a point on the boundary, we can ﬁnd q2,w 1,w 2 such that the system
will converge to that point. Reverting to our standard notations and working backward (we use monotonicity
here, which is easy to check), this says that from any initial p1 and p2,w ec a nﬁnd values V1 and V2 so that the
system continuously converges to some point on the boundary (with the appropriate pooling values as the limit).
This completes the proof of existence. ¥
26